Citation
Solving a cooperative project scheduling with controllable processing times, self-interested agents and equal profit sharing. In proceedings of the 6th Multidisciplinary International Conference on Scheduling : Theory and Applications (MISTA 2013), 27 - 30 Aug 2013, Ghent, Belgium, pages 125-132, 2013.
Paper
Abstract
This paper considers a cooperative project that involves a set of self-interested agents, each in charge of a part of the project. An agent can reduce the duration of the activities he is responsible for, by gathering extra-resources, at a given cost. If the overall project ends earlier than expected, the client o?ers a reward to be shared equally among agents. The ?nancial outcome for each agent therefore depends on all agents decisions and on the satisfaction of the customer, which is function of the project makespan. Under these assumptions, we address the problem of ?nding a Nash equilibrium, ensuring the stability of the schedule, that minimizes the project makespan. We explain how this problem, which is NP-hard, can be e?ciently modeled and solved with mixed integer linear programming.
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Bibtex
@INPROCEEDINGS{2013-125-132-P, author = {C. Briand and S. Ulrich Ngueveu and P. Sucha},
title = {Solving a cooperative project scheduling with controllable processing times, self-interested agents and equal profit sharing},
booktitle = {In proceedings of the 6th Multidisciplinary International Conference on Scheduling : Theory and Applications (MISTA 2013), 27 - 30 Aug 2013, Ghent, Belgium},
year = {2013},
editor = {G. Kendall and B. McCollum and G. {Venden Berghe}},
pages = {125--132},
note = {Paper},
abstract = {This paper considers a cooperative project that involves a set of self-interested agents, each in charge of a part of the project. An agent can reduce the duration of the activities he is responsible for, by gathering extra-resources, at a given cost. If the overall project ends earlier than expected, the client o?ers a reward to be shared equally among agents. The ?nancial outcome for each agent therefore depends on all agents decisions and on the satisfaction of the customer, which is function of the project makespan. Under these assumptions, we address the problem of ?nding a Nash equilibrium, ensuring the stability of the schedule, that minimizes the project makespan. We explain how this problem, which is NP-hard, can be e?ciently modeled and solved with mixed integer linear programming.},
owner = {Graham},
timestamp = {2017.01.16},
webpdf = {2013-125-132-P.pdf} }