Scheduling competition in the airline industry and the issue of duplicate bookings. In proceedings of the 7th Multidisciplinary International Conference on Scheduling : Theory and Applications (MISTA 2015), 25 - 28 Aug 2015, Prague, Czech Republic, pages 55-62, 2015.
Paper
In this study, we consider the relationship between a passenger’s behaviour and competition over ?ight schedules and prices between two airlines. In particular, by focusing on how an early option to purchase tickets a?ects duopoly competition in this industry, we consider duplicate bookings when passengers’ travel plans are uncertain. In our model, airlines can set their ticket prices twice: before and after passengers know their exact travel plans. We ?nd that in a subgame perfect equilibrium, ?ights operate on an e?cient schedule from a passenger perspective (i.e. a passenger’s expected loss of utility is minimized).
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@INPROCEEDINGS{2015-055-062-P, author = {R. Ishii and K. Nakagawa},
title = {Scheduling competition in the airline industry and the issue of duplicate bookings},
booktitle = {In proceedings of the 7th Multidisciplinary International Conference on Scheduling : Theory and Applications (MISTA 2015), 25 - 28 Aug 2015, Prague, Czech Republic},
year = {2015},
editor = {Z. Hanzalek and G. Kendall and B. McCollum and P. Sucha},
pages = {55--62},
note = {Paper},
abstract = { In this study, we consider the relationship between a passenger’s behaviour and competition over ?ight schedules and prices between two airlines. In particular, by focusing on how an early option to purchase tickets a?ects duopoly competition in this industry, we consider duplicate bookings when passengers’ travel plans are uncertain. In our model, airlines can set their ticket prices twice: before and after passengers know their exact travel plans. We ?nd that in a subgame perfect equilibrium, ?ights operate on an e?cient schedule from a passenger perspective (i.e. a passenger’s expected loss of utility is minimized).},
owner = {Graham},
timestamp = {2017.01.16},
webpdf = {2015-055-062-P.pdf} }